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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the connection between management of canal 
(gravity) irrigation and farmers’ social behavior. From this perspective, we examine the benefits 
of a rural canal irrigation project, based on our hypothesis that social behaviors of local farmers 
are influenced by the availability of canal irrigation due to the collective irrigation management 
required in irrigated societies. The present paper (1) measures social behavior through 
behavioral game experiments, and (2) estimates the effects of irrigation, neighborhood, as well 
as individual characteristics. Drawing on the results of dictator game and ultimatum game as the 
dependent variables, with a household survey on 245 villagers in the province of Bohol, the 
Philippines, we employ the HLM (Hierarchical Linear Modeling) method which was originally 
designed to explore neighborhood effects and social contexts. To date, the model has provided 
quantitative analyses of the latter. Yet, it has not been fully utilized for neighborhood effects 
studies. Our regression result shows that the level of measured social behavior is fairly 
associated with 1) access to irrigation water in the village, 2) other neighborhood characteristics 
(e.g., village-level averages of schooling years, asset, and yield) 3) household’s socioeconomic 
and agricultural characteristics (e.g., household-level schooling years, asset, and yield). The 
result indicates that the availability of irrigation water in the village does not only improve 
agricultural productivity but also enhances social relationship among farmers, which would add 
to the importance of irrigation investment in rural areas. 
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1. Introduction 
In general, irrigation projects are conducted for the purpose of enhancing agricultural 
productivity by improving farmers’ access to water resources. Curiously, despite the rising 
number of studies on the impact assessment of irrigation projects, few studies have attempted 
to address the social effects of irrigation projects on farmers in the fields. Even so, for the past 
several decades, many researchers and activists in the area of rural development have realized 
the role of communities from the perspective of participatory and cooperative activities (Korten 
1980). Ostrom (2000), for instance, stresses the importance of unselfish and collective actions 
in irrigation management, though in qualitative manners. In this context, what is especially 
interesting from our viewpoint is to empirically and quantitatively examine whether the social 
effects of an irrigation scheme affect farmers’ behavioral patterns, by utilizing the data on 
irrigation availability and socio-economic characteristics. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
 
Before embarking upon our statistical analysis, we briefly explain the theoretical tools employed 
in this study; 1) behavioral game experiments and 2) hierarchical level model. Our aim is less to 
provide technical details than to explain the benefits of the game experiments to describe 
altruistic and retaliating behaviors, and the advantages of hierarchical level modeling when 
analyzing nested or multi-level data. 
 
2.1 Behavioral Game Experiments 
Behavioral game experiments are designed so as to quantify participants’ social behavior under 
strategic situations (Gintis 2003). Among a range of games, this study employs dictator game 
and ultimatum game, which are developed to explore altruistic and retaliating behaviors, 
respectively. 
 
2.2 Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) 
While ANOVA and OLS analyses are commonly practiced in formal quantitative assessments, 
care must be taken when the data are nested (Raudenbush and Byrk 1993). HLM1 methodology 
is a proper tool to analyze nested and multi-level data. Our survey in Bohol was conducted on 
randomly selected 245 rice farmers who reside in 3 municipalities and 18 barangays.2 Therefore, 
we employ HLM to account for the barangay-level characteristics that are expected to affect 
individual-level social behaviors. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Behavioral Game Experiments 
Our dependent variables are obtained from the behavioral game experiments, conducted by the 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). Nine games were played, among which two are 
used in this study: 1) dictator game and 2) ultimatum game, both of which are commonly 
practiced in experimental and behavioral economics studies. 
 
3.1.1 Dictator Game 
This game is intended to elicit participants’ fairness, generosity, or altruism (Hoffman et al., 
1996). Under anonymity conditions, a sender and a receiver from the same barangay form a 
pair, and only the sender is given 100 PHP at the beginning. 3 The sender is then asked to 
decide on the amount out of the 100 PHP to transfer to the receiver. Since the receiver’s payoff 
is totally dependent on the sender’s altruism in this setting, the transferred amount is recorded 
and interpreted as the altruistic behavior of the sender (Bardsely 2008). 
 
3.1.2 Ultimatum Game 
Again, a sender and a receiver form a pair under anonymity, and the sender is supposed to 
transfer some cash out of 100 PHP initially given to him or her. In ultimatum game, the receiver 
then decides to either accept or reject the transfer. If the receiver accepts it, the cash is 
transferred just as in dictator game. However, if the receiver rejects it, both the sender and 
                                               
1
 We only provide a brief concept of the HLM. For readers who wish to obtain further details, we recommend a 
reference to Hox (2010). 
2
 Barangay is the smallest administrative division in the Philippines after purok. The local government hierarchy in the 
Philippines consists of 5 levels; purok, barangay, municipality, provinces, and autonomous Regions, in ascending 
order. Note that not all barangays have puroks. 
3
 100 PHP is equivalent to 2.46 (USD) by Bloomberg currency data, as of 31 January 2013. The Philippines’ GDP per 
capita is $2,370 (2011) as per World Bank data. Given these exchange rate and GDP per capita, 100 PHP is 
considered sufficient to ensure incentive compatibility for the experiment purpose. 
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receiver end up with a zero payoff. The receiver is asked to indicate the threshold amount below 
which he or she rejects the transfer from the sender. The threshold amount is recorded as the 
result of ultimatum game, and is interpreted as an indicator of the receiver’s retaliating behavior 
or unwillingness to tolerate the level of distribution (Herbert et al., 2003). 
 
3.1.3 Game Results 
Table 1 shows the averages of the game experiments results. Judging from the t-test4, it is clear 
that there are significant differences in measured level of social behavior between the irrigated 
and rainfed areas. The irrigated farmers show a higher level of altruism, while the non-irrigated 
farmers exhibit a higher level of retaliation, suggesting that there is some force in irrigated 
communities that drives accumulation of “good” social behavior. A more formal testing of the 
marginal effect of access to irrigation will be tested by regression analyses in the following 
sections. 
 
Table 1 Results for Behavioral Game Experiments 
Type of Anonymous Partner 
(1) Irrigated Sample 
(N=131) 
(2) Rainfed Sample 
(N=114) 
(3) t-test for mean 
difference |(1)-(2)| 
Dictator Game 
Someone in Sender’s Purok 
33.97 27.81 6.16** 
(20.59) (19.04) [0.015] 
Someone in Sender’s Barangay 
32.06 27.11 4.96* 
(21.58) (18.28) [0.053] 
Ultimatum Game 
Someone in Sender’s Purok 
24.43 34.83 10.40*** 
(15.15) (19.61) [0.000] 
Someone in Sender’s Barangay 
25.12 34.47 9.36*** 
(16.47) (21.29) [0.000] 
The numbers show the averages, except that the standard deviations are in the parentheses, and the p-values are in 
the brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
3.2 HLM 
The next step is to find the determinants of social behavior, in particular, the extent of irrigation 
effects. Table 2 summarizes the explanatory variables to be included in the regression model; 
i.e., age of household head, years of schooling of household head, household’s asset holding, 
household size5, and parcel size. In the HLM framework, Level 1 corresponds to the household-
level socioeconomic and agricultural characteristics, whereas Level 2 considers the barangay-
level averages as neighborhood characteristics. Access to irrigation is represented by the 
barangay-level irrigation dummy, i.e., the value takes 1 if irrigated, and 0 if non-irrigated.6 
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of the Explanatory Variables for Two Levels in HLM 
Level 1 (Household Level) 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Age 238 51.38 12.06 14 87 
                                               
4
 If the null hypothesis is rejected, the means of the two samples are statistically not different. 
5 Household size is defined as the number of family members. 
6 Irrigation dummy has no variance within the same barangay. Therefore, it is regarded as a barangay-level variable. 
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Schooling Years 238 6.33 3.02 0 14 
Asset Holding (Log PhP) 238 10.61 1.09 6.21 13.31 
Household Size 238 5.93 2.32 1 12.5 
Parcel Size (ha) 238 1.45 1.02 0.12 8.12 
Level 2 (Barangay Level) 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Irrigation Dummy 18 0.61 0.5 0 1 
Age 18 51.3 4.5 43.56 61 
Schooling Years 18 6.37 0.93 4.46 8 
Asset Holding (Log PhP) 18 10.57 0.52 9.44 11.53 
Household Size 18 5.99 1.1 4.65 8.76 
Parcel Size (ha) 18 1.31 0.46 0.58 2.19 
 
We adopt the bottom-up approach7 in performing HLM, starting from the intercept-only model 
(unconditional model) specified as 
 
                     (1) 
 
where     is the social behavior measurements for the head of household   in barangay  ,     is 
the intercept term,      is the barangay-level residual, and     is the household-level residual. 
The intercept-only model is used as a specification test to decide whether or not to adopt HLM. 
The Intraclass Correlation (ICC) is defined as: 
 
     
   
 
    
    
  
      (2) 
 
where    
  is the variance of    , and   
  is the variance of    . Typically, when ICC is less than 
0.05, OLS is preferred to HLM. 
 
Table 3 shows the result of the specification test by the intercept-only model. The ICC indicates 
that 8.5% of the variance in dictator game result and 12% of the variance in ultimatum game 
result are explained by the between-barangay variance in the respective game results.8 The p-
values and ICC both suggest the use of HLM for our analyses. 
 
                                               
7
 There are two strategies for building HLM. The top-down approach is to start by including the maximum number of 
variables and then remove some of them. For empirical analyses, however, the bottom-up approach, which starts 
with the simplest formula and then adds variables, is often adopted. (Hox, 2010) 
8
 ICC typically ranges from 0.05 to 0.25 in social science studies. 
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Table 3 Estimates for Intercept-only Model 
Random 
Coefficient 
St. Dev. Variance Component d.f. 
2
 p-value ICC 
Dictator Game 
Intercept 1, u0 5.830 33.989 17 38.817 0.002 0.085 
Level-1, r 19.079 364.008 
 
Ultimatum Game 
INTRCPT1, u0 6.668 44.463 17 49.456 <0.001 0.120 
Level-1, r 17.725 314.163 
 
 
Proceeding to the HLM estimations, the Level-1 and Level-2 equations are specified as below: 
[Level-1 Equation] 
 
Yij = β0j + β1j (Ageij) + β2j (Schooling Yearsij) + β3j (Assetij) + β4j (Household Sizeij) + β5j 
(Parcel Sizeij) + rij 
 
[Level-2 Equation] 
β0j = γ00 + u0j,  β1j = γ10 + u1j,  β2j = γ20 + u2j,  β3j = γ30 + u3j,  β4j = γ40 + u4j,  β5j = γ50 + u5j 
 
At Level-1, the explanatory variables are centered around the barangay means, which is useful 
in analyzing the within-barangay effects of the variables. Level-2 specifies the effects of 
barangay-level characteristics to account for the between-barangay effects. 
In Table 4 presents the estimates for Level-1 equation, in which β0 (intercept) includes the 
contribution from the barangay effects. Age has a significant and negative effect on altruism, 
suggesting that older farmers tend to be less generous. 
 
Table 4 Estimates for Level-1 Equations 
Game Type β0 (Intercept 1) Age 
Schooling 
Years 
Asset 
Household 
Size 
Parcel Size 
Dictator 28.789*** -0.268*** 0.109 -0.658 0.143 0.375 
Ultimatum 28.117*** -0.067 -0.578* -1.984* -0.427 0.797 
*** p < 0.01,  * p < 0.10   
 
Using the barangay-average variables, Level-2 equation is further specified as follows: 
 
β0j = γ00 + γ01 (Irrigation Dummyj) + γ02 (Agej) + γ03 (Schooling Yearj) + γ04 (Assetj) + γ05 
(Household Sizej) + γ06 (Parcel Sizej) + u0j, β1j = γ10 + u1j, β2j = γ20 + u2j, β3j = γ30 + u3j,  
β4j = γ40 + u4j, β5j = γ50 + u5j 
 
Finally, the nested equation is given by: 
 
Yij = γ00 + γ01 (Irrigation Dummyj) + γ02 (Agej) + γ03 (Schooling Yearj) + γ04 (Assetj) + γ05 
(Household Sizej) + γ06 (Parcel Sizej) + γ10 (Ageij) + γ20 (Schooling Yearij) + γ30 (Assetij) + 
γ40 (Household Sizeij) + γ50 (Parcel Sizeij) + u0j + u1j (Ageij) + u2j (Schooling yearij) + u3j 
(Assetij) + u4j (Household Sizeij) + u5j (Parcel Sizeij)+ rij 
 
Title: A Comparative Study of Social Behavior in Irrigated and Rainfed Areas:  
The Case of Bohol Irrigation Scheme, the Philippines 
Authors: Hogeun Park, Takuji W. Tsusaka, and Valerien O. Pede 
Session: Rural 
6 
 
Table 5 presents the effects of barangay-level characteristics. The irrigation dummy poses 
significant effects on the results of both types of games. The effect is found to be positive on 
dictator game result, indicating that the availability of irrigation induces the accumulation of 
altruistic behavior among farmers. In contrast, the irrigation effect on ultimatum game result is 
found to be negative, indicating that the availability of irrigation leads farmers to tolerating 
inequitable distributions of limited resources. The barangay-level asset holding shows effects 
that are similar to those of irrigation dummy, which suggests that living in wealthier 
neighborhoods contribute to enhancement in tolerance among farmers. 
 
Table 5 Estimates for Level-2 Equations 
Game Type γ00 (Intercept 2) 
Irrigation 
Dummy 
Age 
Schooling 
Years 
Asset 
Household 
Size 
Parcel 
Size 
Dictator 23.387*** 9.053* 0.166 -0.259 4.348* -0.724 6.087 
Ultimatum 39.092*** -14.012*** -0.697** -1.124 -8.585*** 0.885 -4.964 
*** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.10 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
To quantitatively examine the impact of the availability of canal irrigation on farmers’ social 
behavior, this paper has introduced a unique combination of methods: behavioral game 
experiments and HLM analysis. Although further empirical evidence is awaited to support our 
findings, the result is highly suggestive of the significant social effects of canal irrigation 
schemes. The positive effect on altruism and the negative effect on retaliation indicate that the 
type of social interactions promoted by the necessity for collective irrigation management leads 
to inducing the accumulation of “good” social behavior among farmers. 
 
One clue to validating the irrigation effect is to consider the existence of TSAs (turnout service 
associations) in the irrigated communities. After the canal irrigation scheme was introduced in 
2008, TSAs were formed in each barangay to perform several roles such as canal maintenance, 
private canal construction, purchasing machinery, and providing micro credit for the TSA 
members. Thus, as compared with the rainfed, irrigated farmers are exposed to more 
opportunities to meet and discuss public arrangements with their neighbors, which is likely to 
enhance the social relationship in irrigated neighborhood. Hence, canal irrigation seems to 
serve a dual role: to boost the rural economy through increased production, and to accumulate 
social capital among farmers. 
 
The limitation of our study needs to be duly noted. Our behavioral game experiments were 
conducted in 2011 which was after the construction of irrigation. This survey structure prevents 
us from formulating a difference-in-difference estimator that ensures a more proper impact 
assessment. 
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